Bachelorarbeiten
Ring Oscillator Side Channel Attacks based on Simulated Templates
Beschreibung
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) use intrinsic hardware variations to derive device-dependent secret values. One approach is to measure the frequencies of on-chip ring oscillators (ROs), which depend on uncontrollable manufacturing differences of their comprising transistors.
Since these frequencies are supposed to stay secret, side-channel analyses pose a thread to the security of oscillator-based PUF systems. For example, the power consumption can be measured, frequency-transformed, and the oscillator frequencies determined using a peak search.
This approach can be expanded by comparing measured side channel traces against simulated templates for different RO frequency hypotheses, picking the best match.
The aim of this work is to
- expand an existing basic template building approach (implemented in Python using Numpy),
- incorporate different physical effects, such as jitter and quantisation, and
- estimate the prospects of an attack based on existing power side channel measurement traces.
Voraussetzungen
- Significant experience using Numpy or Julia
- Basic knowledge of signal processing (FFTs, correlations)
Kontakt
If you are interested in this work, please contact me via email with a short CV and grade report. We will then arrange a short meeting where we can discuss the details.
Jonas Ruchti, M.Sc.
Technical University of Munich, Chair of Security in Information Technology
Room N1010
E-Mail: j.ruchti@tum.de
Betreuer:
Masterarbeiten
Ring Oscillator Side Channel Attacks based on Simulated Templates
Beschreibung
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) use intrinsic hardware variations to derive device-dependent secret values. One approach is to measure the frequencies of on-chip ring oscillators (ROs), which depend on uncontrollable manufacturing differences of their comprising transistors.
Since these frequencies are supposed to stay secret, side-channel analyses pose a thread to the security of oscillator-based PUF systems. For example, the power consumption can be measured, frequency-transformed, and the oscillator frequencies determined using a peak search.
This approach can be expanded by comparing measured side channel traces against simulated templates for different RO frequency hypotheses, picking the best match.
The aim of this work is to
- expand an existing basic template building approach (implemented in Python using Numpy),
- incorporate different physical effects, such as jitter and quantisation, and
- estimate the prospects of an attack based on existing power side channel measurement traces.
Voraussetzungen
- Significant experience using Numpy or Julia
- Basic knowledge of signal processing (FFTs, correlations)
Kontakt
If you are interested in this work, please contact me via email with a short CV and grade report. We will then arrange a short meeting where we can discuss the details.
Jonas Ruchti, M.Sc.
Technical University of Munich, Chair of Security in Information Technology
Room N1010
E-Mail: j.ruchti@tum.de
Betreuer:
Forschungspraxis (Research Internships)
Ring Oscillator Side Channel Attacks based on Simulated Templates
Beschreibung
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) use intrinsic hardware variations to derive device-dependent secret values. One approach is to measure the frequencies of on-chip ring oscillators (ROs), which depend on uncontrollable manufacturing differences of their comprising transistors.
Since these frequencies are supposed to stay secret, side-channel analyses pose a thread to the security of oscillator-based PUF systems. For example, the power consumption can be measured, frequency-transformed, and the oscillator frequencies determined using a peak search.
This approach can be expanded by comparing measured side channel traces against simulated templates for different RO frequency hypotheses, picking the best match.
The aim of this work is to
- expand an existing basic template building approach (implemented in Python using Numpy),
- incorporate different physical effects, such as jitter and quantisation, and
- estimate the prospects of an attack based on existing power side channel measurement traces.
Voraussetzungen
- Significant experience using Numpy or Julia
- Basic knowledge of signal processing (FFTs, correlations)
Kontakt
If you are interested in this work, please contact me via email with a short CV and grade report. We will then arrange a short meeting where we can discuss the details.
Jonas Ruchti, M.Sc.
Technical University of Munich, Chair of Security in Information Technology
Room N1010
E-Mail: j.ruchti@tum.de